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Empirical analysis of OECD countries 
 
Financial systems, financing constraints, and investment 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the influence of cash flow on corporate investment in eleven 
OECD countries. We find that the sensitivity of investment levels to internally 
available funds differs significantly across countries, and is lower in countries with 
predominantly close bank-firm relationships than in countries with predominantly 
arm’s-length bank-firm relationships. At the same time, we find no relationship of the 
levels of financial constraints to indicators of overall financial development. Our 
results are consistent with the view that information and incentive problems in the 
capital market have important effects on corporate investment, and that close bank-
firm relationships can reduce these problems and thus improve the access of firms to 
external finance. 
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1. Introduction 
Companies in various countries operate under dramatically different financial 
systems. The differences in the level of development of financial systems (as 
reflected, for example, in the volume of credit relative to gross domestic product 
(GDP) and the relative stock market capitalization relative to GDP), in patterns of 
relationships of owners and managers, of firms and creditors, the level of activity of 
the market for corporate control are well documented. Do these differences influence 
the investment patterns of firms in these countries?  
In a perfect capital market, funds will always be available to firms with 
positive net present value investment opportunities. However, economic theories 
suggest that market frictions such as information asymmetries and incentive problems 
may make external capital more costly for firms, and firms with profitable investment 
opportunities may not always obtain necessary capital. This implies that financial 
factors, such as the volume of internally generated funds and the availability of new 
debt and equity, determine the firms’ investment decisions. There is now a large 
empirical literature that investigates the influence of the availability of external funds 
on corporate investment decisions (see e.g. Fazzari et al. (1988), Hoshi et al. (1991), 
Chapman et al. (1996), Samuel (1998)). Most studies find that financial variables 
such as cash flow help to explain investment levels of firms. This finding is 
interpreted as suggesting that firms are constrained in their investment by availability 
of external funds. 
Many models emphasize that well-functioning financial intermediaries and 
markets ameliorate information asymmetries and transaction costs, mitigate risks and 
thereby mobilize savings for investment in longer-term and higher-return projects and 
foster efficient resource allocation (see the review by Levine (1997)). We thus may 
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expect that firms in countries with more developed financial systems will have a 
better access to external finance. 
Several authors have suggested that establishing close relationship between 
firms and financial institutions mitigates financial market frictions still further. Thus, 
given the level of development of a financial system, firms with close ties to financial 
institutions should have a lower cost of capital and greater availability of funds 
relative to firms without such ties. A number of studies have found that firm-creditor 
relationships indeed improve the access of firms to external finance. We may 
therefore expect that firms in countries where close bank-firm relationships 
predominate to be less financially constrained than firms in countries where arm’s-
length bank-firm relationships predominate.  
A number of studies undertaking cross-country comparisons of investment-
cash flow sensitivity suggest that the effects of these characteristics of financial 
systems may indeed be important. Thus, the literature finds that investment is more 
sensitive to cash flow in the USA than in France (Mulkay et al., 2000), in the UK than 
in Germany (Bond et al., 1999), and in the UK than in Belgium, France and Germany 
(Bond et al., 2003). The authors of the last two papers argue that these differences are 
likely to be caused by differences in financial systems. Two or four countries, of 
course, may differ in many aspects of financial systems, and may also differ on other 
factors influencing investment decisions of firms. It is difficult to draw strong 
inferences about the effects of financial systems from the results of the papers 
mentioned. Such inferences would require a direct econometric analysis of a 
relationship between the indicators of financial systems and the indicators of financial 
constraints on investment, on a larger sample of countries. Two studies undertake 
such an investigation. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), for large samples of 
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firms in 26 countries, calculate the proportion of firms in a country that were growing 
faster than they could have using only internally generated funds. They show that this 
proportion is positively related to financial development. As Love (2001) notes, this 
analysis says little about the efficiency of fund allocation: it is unclear whether the 
firms that grew at a higher rate were the ones with the best investment opportunities. 
Love (2001), for a sample of firms from 40 countries, establishes that firms in 
countries with more developed financial systems are less financially constrained. Her 
analysis, however, has some technical problems which could have lead to biased 
results. Neither study investigates the influence of the character of investor-firm 
relationship on investment decisions. 
This paper aims at investigating whether differences in financial systems (both 
in financial development and in the character of investor-firm relationship) affect the 
financial constraints the firms face. We construct a panel dataset for manufacturing 
firms in eleven developed countries1 and use it to estimate to what extent investment 
levels of firms in different countries are sensitive to the availability of internal funds. 
We then investigate whether differences in these sensitivities are related to the 
characteristics of financial systems of the countries.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical arguments 
suggesting the directions of influence of financial systems on the availability of 
external finance for firms are discussed in Section 2, and the relevant empirical 
literature is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses methodology and data, and 
Section 5 presents the results of the analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Theory 
From the perspective of the neoclassical theory, as the famous analysis by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) has established, investment decisions of a firm are 
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independent of the capital structure choice. Perfect capital markets ensure that 
external funds are perfect substitutes for internal capital. Firms are thus indifferent 
between various means to finance their investment. Numerous theoretical studies have 
argued, however, that the assumption of perfect capital markets cannot be maintained. 
Most important among capital market imperfections are the problems of asymmetric 
information. Myers and Majluf (1984) show that if managers are better informed than 
investors about the firm’s prospects, the firm’s risky securities will sometimes be 
underpriced, thereby raising the costs of external finance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argue that interests of owners diverge in several important ways from interests of 
creditors: owners prefer riskier projects, have an incentive to issue a new debt senior 
to the existing one (thus increasing the risk for existing creditors), when a risk of 
bankruptcy is present, have an incentive to expropriate assets from the firm, and in 
bankrupt states have no incentive to apply efforts to improve the returns. These 
incentive problems raise the cost of credit. 
The literature thus suggests that, because of information and incentive 
problems, external finance is more expensive than internal funds. Firms therefore may 
face financing constraints, which means that financial factors, such as the volume of 
internally generated funds and the availability of new debt and equity, will influence 
the firms’ investment decisions.  
More developed financial systems are likely to increase the availability and 
reduce the cost of capital for firms (see the review by Levine (1997)). Financial 
intermediaries and securities markets provide vehicles for trading, pooling, and 
diversifying risks, and thus mitigate the risks associated with individual firms, 
industries, regions, countries, etc., and induce a portfolio shift towards projects with 
higher expected return. Financial intermediaries allow individuals to economize on 
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the costs of acquiring and processing information about investments. This facilitates 
the acquisition and processing of information, allows better selection of the most 
promising projects, and thereby improves resource allocation. Financial 
intermediaries also allow to pool, and thus economize on, monitoring costs. Stock 
markets facilitate the acquisition and dissemination of information about firms. By 
linking managerial compensation to stock prices owners can align the interests of 
managers with theirs. Developed stock markets facilitate the functioning of the market 
for corporate control, which further aligns the interests of managers with those of the 
owners. All this increases the incentives of individuals to invest in riskier projects 
with higher return and in long-term projects, and facilitates the mobilization of 
individual savings for investment in such projects. We therefore expect firms in 
countries with more developed financial systems to be less financially constrained 
than firms in countries with less developed financial systems. 
Close bank-firm relationships are likely to increase the availability and reduce 
the cost of capital for firms. “Through close and continued interaction, a firm may 
provide a lender with a sufficient information about, and a voice in, the firm’s affairs 
so as to lower the cost and increase the availability of credit” (Petersen and Rajan, 
1994, p. 5).  The amount of this information, and the strength of this ‘voice’, are even 
larger if lenders also own equity stakes in firms, as is the case in countries such as 
Germany and Japan.  
Close relationship may facilitate provision of capital to firms in financial 
distress but with viable prospects. A bank may provide capital to such a firm, if it 
repays to the bank when the firm’s financial conditions improve. But such a firm has 
an incentive to renege on such an agreement, and thus cannot credibly commit itself 
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without additional arrangements. Long-term close bank-firm relationship helps to 
resolve this problem (Mayer, 1988). 
Under close bank-firm relationships both parties have a better understanding 
of each other, monitoring costs are reduced (Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001). 
Contracts can be renegotiated at a lower cost (Sako, 1992; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). 
If a bank is both a creditor and a shareholder of a firm, the firm has less incentive to 
take actions that benefit one class of investors at the expense of another (Aoki, 1984), 
and conflicts that arise among investors when a firm is near default are reduced 
(Hoshi et al., 1991). During periods of tight money, a bank is less likely to sharply 
increase interest rates to firms with which it has close relationships to firms the 
relationships with which are arm’s-length (Congigliani e.a., 1997). Finally, a bank’s 
involvement with a firm signals the firm’s creditworthiness to other investors 
(Audretsch and Elston, 1999). 
To summarize, the theory predicts that close banking ties are likely to increase 
availability and decrease the cost of capital to firms. We would therefore expect firms 
in countries where close bank-firm relationships predominate to be less financially 
constrained than firms in countries where arm’s-length bank-firm relationships 
predominate.  
3. Related empirical literature 
Our paper is related to several strands of recent empirical literature. Two 
papers analyse whether firms with close bank relationships face weaker financial 
constraints on investment. Hoshi et al. (1991) find this to be the case for Japanese 
firms, and Audretsch and Elston (1999) – for German firms. Becht and Ramirez 
(2003) show that in the pre-World War I period German the firms in mining and steel 
industries that were not affiliated with one of the large universal banks were 
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financially constrained, while this was not the case for firms affiliated with banks. 
Houston and James (2001) find that, among 250 large US firms, those with a 
relationship with a single bank are less financially constrained, provided that the 
investment is not too large (less than 100 percent of capital stock), but firms requiring 
larger investments are more constrained when they have a single bank. It is important 
to note, though, that a relationship with a single bank would not necessarily be 
‘close’.  
Several other papers establish that close bank-firm relationships increase 
availability and reduce the costs of debt finance to firms. Petersen and Rajan (1994) 
argue that trade credit is the most expensive external source of finance, and so firms 
that use trade credit more are likely to be debt-constrained. For a sample of about 
3400 US enterprises with fewer than 500 employees, they find that the extent of trade 
credit usage is negatively related to the duration of existing lending relationships. 
Petersen and Rajan find that interest rates charged by banks are not related to the 
duration of lending relationships. This result is confirmed by Blackwell and Winters 
(1997) who use records of bank loans to small and medium enterprises; the authors 
show, however, that interest rates are lower when loan commitments from the bank 
represent a larger fraction of the firm’s total debt. Berger and Udell (1995), using the 
same dataset as Petersen and Rajan (1994), find that firms with longer lending 
relationships have to pledge collateral less frequently and have to pay lower interest 
rates on loan commitments. Weinstein and Yafeh (1994) find that small Japanese 
firms with close bank relationships are more capital-intensive, indicating weaker 
financial constraints on investment. For German SMEs, Harhoff and Körting (1998) 
and Lehmann and Neuberger (2001) find that ‘house banks’ provide credit more 
readily and at lower interest rates, and Elsas and Krahnen (1998) find that ‘house 
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banks’ provide liquidity insurance in situations of unexpected deterioration of 
borrower rating (although they do not find evidence that ‘house banks’ charge lower 
interest rates). For Japan, Hoshi et al. (1990) find that firms with strong ties to the 
‘main bank’ are more able to invest when they are financially distressed. For Italy, 
recent work shows that credit access increases with the exclusiveness and duration of 
the relationship between a firm and a bank (see the review in Foglia et al., 1998). 
D’Auria et al. (1999) find that the closeness of lending relationship, measured by a 
bank’s share of the customer’s debt, is the main determinants of individual loan rates 
for large and medium firms, with large shares associated with lower interest rates. 
The literature also suggests that firms in countries with more developed 
financial systems (as measured by the volume of credit and the relative stock market 
capitalization, relative to GDP) are less financially constrained. Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), for a sample of 49 countries, find that manufacturing industries with higher 
external capital requirements grow faster in countries with higher financial 
development. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), for a sample of firms in 26 
countries, calculate the proportion of firms in a country that were growing faster than 
they could have using only internally generated funds. They show that this proportion 
is positively related to financial development. Love (2001), for a sample of firms from 
40 countries, establishes that firms in countries with more developed financial 
systems are less financially constrained. Love conducts two kinds of tests. First, she 
estimates a model on the sample pooling all countries, including the interaction term 
of cash variable with country-level indicators of financial development. This test is 
problematic, however, because the assumption that the influence of other factors 
influencing investment decisions is similar across countries is questionable. Second, 
she estimates regressions for individual countries, and regresses the cash coefficients 
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obtained in them on country-level indicators of financial development. This second 
test is also the one we conduct in this paper. We have, however, refrained from using 
the coefficients obtained by Love, and decided to construct our own dataset and 
conduct our own estimations. There are two reasons for this. First, contrary to all 
other authors, Love uses a sample of all non-financial firms and not just 
manufacturing firms. The investment behaviour of non-manufacturing firms may 
differ significantly from that described in traditional investment models (see e.g. 
Whited, 1992), as Love herself admits2. Second, there are econometric problems 
involved in Love’s analysis. The author uses the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) for estimation on the panel data with often very few firms (less than 100 
firms for 20 out of 40 countries). Mulkay et al. (2000), for samples of firms from 
France and the US, find that instruments usually used in estimations of investment 
equations (and used by Love) are very weak in their case. Recently the evidence has 
accumulated that the use of GMM where only weak instruments are available 
produces very imprecise estimates of coefficients, which are also possibly biased 
when the sample size is not very large (less than about 500 units) (see Mulkay et al. 
(2000) and references therein). As Mulkay et al. note, “this feature of GMM is 
especially problematic for comparative purposes because it implies that we will accept 
similarity of behavior between countries… when it is not present” (p. 3). It is 
suggestive that only 9 out of 40 cash coefficients in Love’s estimations for individual 
countries are significantly different from zero at conventional levels. For countries in 
our sample, only one is significantly different from zero. It is likely that the weakness 
of instruments and the resulting imprecision of estimates are responsible for this 
result. In any case, it would be inappropriate for us to make inferences about cross-
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country differences on the basis of coefficient all but one of which do not differ 
significantly from zero (and, in most cases, from each other) and are possibly biased. 
There are other papers comparing the investment-cash flow sensitivity of firms 
across countries. Bond et al. (1999) find that this sensitivity is higher for British than 
for German firms, Bond et al. (2003) – that it is higher for British than for Belgian, 
French and German firms, and Mulkay et al. (2000) – that it is higher for the US than 
for French firms.  
4. Methodology and data 
We use the following methodology to analyse the effect of financial systems 
on the sensitivity of corporate investment to the availability of internal funds. First,  
we estimate the sensitivity of investment level to cash flow for firms in each country. 
We then regress the coefficients estimated in these regressions on variables reflecting 
the character of financial systems in these countries3.
The econometric model we estimate in the first step is based on the q-theory 
framework. Absent capital market imperfections, the value-maximizing firm will 
invest as long as the shadow value of an additional unit of capital, marginal Tobin’s q,
exceeds unity. q thus represents the market’s evaluation of the firm’s investment 
opportunities. In the absence of capital market imperfections, cash flow should be 
irrelevant. A finding that cash flow does matter for investment levels, given q, is 
taken as evidence of a financial constraint. Since marginal q is not observable, 
researchers have used average q in their estimations.  
In the first step we run the following regression: 
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Here It is the firm’s capital expenditures during the year. Kt is the stock of 
capital at the current replacement cost at the beginning of the year. To calculate it, we 
use a standard perpetual inventory method: Kt=(1-)Kt-1+ It, where  is depreciation 
rate. The starting value was based on the net book value of plant, property and 
equipment in the first year for which the data for the firm are available. The rate of 
depreciation was assumed to equal 8%, and the price indices were obtained using the 
GDP deflator from IMF (2001). Qt is market-to-book value at the beginning of the 
year, which controls for the attractiveness of investment opportunities. St are sales 
during the years, included to control for the accelerator effect. Finally, our measure of 
liquidity is CFt, cash flow generated during the period, obtained as net income before 
dividends plus depreciation, depletion and amortization allowances. 
We control for the effects of business cycles by including year dummies. We 
control for firm-specific effects by employing the within estimator: all variables 
employed in the regressions are differences from the mean value for a given firm. 
All firm-level data come from the Worldscope database. This database 
contains the information on the majority of the publicly traded companies in each 
country. An attempt is made by Worldscope to standardize accounting information to 
improve cross-country comparability. The data cover the years 1993-2000.  
Our initial sample included all firms with a primary activity in manufacturing 
(primary SIC codes from 2000 to 3999) with four or more years of continuous data on 
all raw indicators. We excluded subsidiaries of foreign firms. It may be argued that 
very large firms have access to international capital markets, and the features of the 
national financial system are unlikely to influence much their access to external 
finance. It may also be argued that in all financial systems banks monitor small firms 
closer than medium and large firms, and the relationships of a significant proportion 
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of small firms with banks are close in all systems (see Berger and Udell (1995) for the 
USA and Binks and Ennew (1998) for the UK). The difference between the countries 
where bank-firm relationships are predominantly close and the countries where they 
are predominantly arm’s-length is that in the former countries the relationships of 
firms with banks become arm’s-length at a much later point in the firm’s development 
(and at a much larger size) than in the latter countries (see e.g. Vitols, 1997). To infer 
whether differences in financial systems have implications for investment decisions, 
we therefore should exclude small and very large firms from the sample. This also 
makes samples m re comparable across countries, since in some countries much more 
small firms are included in Worldscope’s database than in others. Accordingly, we 
excluded all firms with the volume of sales in their last year in the sample smaller 
than $50mln, and all firms with the volume of sales in their last year in the sample 
larger than $10bln. In order to obtain the measures of variables which are consistent 
over time we made an effort to take into account major merger and acquisition 
activities. In particular, if the value of net plant, property and equipment in a 
particular year differed by a factor of 3 or more from that of the previous year, we 
excluded this observation and all observations for years either before or after it 
(retaining the longer sequence of observations). The sample was cleaned to reduce the 
influence of outliers. Basically we excluded all observations with zero values of K, I 
or S, observations with negative market-to-book ratio, and trimmed the data so that 
one percent of observations in the upper tail of each variables, and in the lower tail of 
cash flow ratio, were removed. After this procedure, some firms had less than four 
years of continuous data; these firms were excluded from the sample. 
Our final sample includes 2601 firms with 11979 observations. Table 1 shows 
the numbers of firms and observations per country, and the means and standard 
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deviations of the variables by country. It can be seen that American and French firm 
have the highest mean values of investment, cash flow and sales ratios, and the 
highest standard deviations of these ratios. Japanese firms have the lowest mean 
values of investment and cash flow ratios, and the second lowest sales ratio, while 
Italy has the second lowest mean values of investment and cash flow ratios, and the 
third second lowest sales ratio. Japanese firms have the lowest standard deviation of 
investment and cash flow ratios, with Australian and Dutch firms also having low 
standard deviations. 
We turn now to country-level variables reflecting the characteristics of the 
financial system. We characterize financial development by the volume of credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions to the private sector relative to 
GDP, and the value of stock market capitalization relative to GDP. These indicators 
have been widely used to proxy for financial development (see e.g. Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1998; Love, 2001). The values of these variables are reported in 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.  
We characterise the closeness of bank-firm relationships in a country by two 
variables. The first is the proportion of total stock market capitalization held by banks. 
The values are reported in column 3 of Table 2. Our second indicator of the closeness 
of bank-firm relationship is build on the basis of the informed opinions of researchers 
on the character of firm-bank relationships in various countries. In the countries in our 
sample, bank-firm relationships are characterized as predominantly close in Finland, 
Germany and Japan, and as predominantly arm’s-length in Australia, Canada, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, and the USA4. Our second variable reflecting 
closeness of bank-firm relationships is thus a dummy equal to 1 for countries with 
predominantly close bank-firm relationships – Finland, Germany and Japan, – and to 
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0 for other countries. Note that the countries where close bank-firm relationships play 
an important role according to the informed experts’ opinion – Finland, Germany and 
Japan – have higher values of the bank equityholdings than the rest of the countries.  
5. Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the estimations of investment equations for the 
eleven countries. We observe that the coefficients of market-to-book ratio and lagged 
sales generally have the expected positive signs and are significant. We also observe 
that coefficients of cash flow ratio in countries with predominantly close bank-firm 
relationships are l wer than in countries with predominantly arm’s-length bank-firm 
relationships. Moreover, coefficients in all countries of the former group are not 
significantly different from zero at conventional levels, while coefficients in all 
countries of the latter group are significantly different from zero. This suggests that 
firms in countries with predominantly close bank-firm relationships are less 
financially constrained than firms in countries with predominantly arm’s-length bank-
firm relationships. 
This is confirmed by the more formal analysis. We regress the coefficients of 
cash flow ratios obtained in these regressions on the variables characterizing the 
financial systems of individual countries. The results are reported in Table 4. The 
regression on bank equityholdings explains a large part of variance, and the 
coefficient of the variable is significant with the expected negative sign. In the 
regression on the dummy for countries with predominantly close bank-firm 
relationships, the coefficient of the dummy is highly significant, and the regression 
explains more than 60 percent of variation in the dependent variable. At the same 
time, for regressions the cash flow coefficients on the variables reflecting financial 
development – the volume of credit relative to GDP and the volume of stock market 
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capitalization relative to GDP – the joint significance of the coefficients is far below 
conventional levels, and in the former case the adjusted R2 is negative. The 
coefficients of the financial variables are not significant. This indicates that in 
developed countries the differences in investment-cash flow sensitivity are not related 
to the differences in financial development. In estimations with more than one 
regressor included the values and significance of coefficients are very close to those in 
bivariate regressions. 
6. Discussion 
The results presented in this paper are consistent with the findings of earlier 
studies that document the value of a close banking relationship. Our results are also 
consistent with the results of the previous cross-country comparisons of financial 
constraints on the firms’ investment (Bond et al., 1999; Mulkay et al., 2000; Bond et 
al., 2003). As in these studies, we find that the firms in the USA and the UK are more 
financially constrained than the firms in France and Germany. Bond e.a. (1999) and 
Bond et al. (2003) argue that their findings suggest that firms in more ‘market-
oriented’ Anglo-Saxon systems are more financially constrained than the firms in 
(less ‘market-oriented’) continental European systems. Our results suggest that this 
inference is not quite correct. There are several continental European countries in our 
sample, with financial systems that could not be easily classified as ‘market-oriented’, 
in which firms are more financially constrained than in the UK and the USA. The 
results of our analysis suggest that it is not ‘market orientation’ per se that is related to 
stronger financial constraints but the arm’s-length character of bank-firm 
relationships.  
Our results for the relationship of financial constraints to financial 
development differ from those obtained by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) 
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and by Love (2001), who find a significant negative relationship. These results and 
ours do not necessarily contradict each other, however. The authors of these two 
papers employ larger samples of countries which include both developed and 
developing countries. While there are significant differences among developed 
countries in the level of financial development, the level of financial development in 
developed countries is generally higher than that in developing countries (especially 
as far as the development of credit market is concerned). It is likely that financial 
development matters for the access of firms to external finance, but once financial 
development reaches a certain level its further increase per se does not improve this 
access; other factors (such as the character of relationships of firms and investors) 
play a more important role. It is also possible that the character of industrial 
development in developed countries differs significantly from that in developing 
countries, ensuring that the factors most significantly influencing the availability of 
external finance for investment differ between the two groups of countries. 
In all countries, of course, there are both firms with arm’s-length relationships 
and firms with close relationships with creditors. However, in most countries a vast 
majority of firms are of one of these types. There are significant forces ensuring that 
this would be the case. Deviating from a predominant pattern has costs of various 
kinds. The regulatory environment almost always supports a predominant type of 
relations in a country and makes it more costly (sometimes prohibitively costly) to 
enter into a different type of relations (see e.g. the discussion of the US regulatory 
environment by Roe (1994)). Various institutions would have developed in a country 
to facilitate the working of the predominant system (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). Close 
relationships are based on mutual trust of the parties, and in an environment where the 
culture of such trust is not present close relationship may be difficult to establish (e.g. 
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Sako, 1992). The firms and financiers may continue to use the arrangement which 
they used in the past because they are familiar with these arrangements (but would 
have to adjust to new ones), or because the old arrangements have led to acceptable 
results, while the effectiveness of other arrangements is uncertain (Fligstein, 1990; 
Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). New firms may use the same arrangements as successful 
established firms in the field (Fligstein, 1990). Some arrangements may become to be 
considered as standard or natural and be used by agents without much contemplation 
(Fligstein, 1990). Particular practices may be institutionalized within the business 
community, and a willingness of an agent to enter them may be considered as a signal 
of her trustworthiness (Powell, 1991). Several authors (e.g. Soskice, 1996, 1999; 
Streeck, 1997; Whitley, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001) have argued that the character 
of the financial system is closely interlinked with the character of other aspects of the 
economic system, and together they form distinctive national patterns of economic 
organization (for example, the character of relationship among managers and 
employees in Germany would be very difficult to sustain without close relationships 
between firms and banks). Moreover, it has been argued that these distinctive patterns 
are deeply embedded in the social system in general (e.g. Hollingsworth, 1997; Orru, 
1997).  
Some may argue that the distinction between financial systems with 
predominantly arm’s-length bank-firm relationships and predominantly close bank-
firm relationships is becoming meaningless in a world of increasingly global financial 
markets. However, the evidence suggests that financial markets are far from 
integrated, and many arguments exist suggesting that such integration is unlikely to 
eliminate differences in national financial systems (see e.g. Berger (1996)). In 
particular, there is little evidence of a decline in the importance of main bank system 
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in Japan. While in 1980s there were signs that some largest Japanese firms weakened 
their connections with main banks, the importance of the main bank system did not 
diminish. In the 1970-90s Japanese companies increased the share of borrowing from 
the main bank; the proportion of firms which changed the main bank decreased for 
medium-size firms; the number of directors dispatched from city banks to other listed 
companies increased by 34 percent from 1980 to 1993 (Corbett, 1998). Differences 
found in this paper between in many respects similar companies in different countries 
indicate that national financial systems continue to matter when it comes to raising 
finance for investment. 
Fixed investments are not the only type of firms’ expenditures sensitive to 
capital market imperfections. Several studies find that this is also the case for 
inventory investments (e.g. Kashyap et al., 1994; Guariglia, 1999; Bo et al., 2002) 
and R&D expenditures (e.g. Rafferty and Funk, 2004). It is therefore likely that close 
relationships with banks also reduce the liquidity constraints on these types of 
expenditures. 
Our finding that stock market development does not help to overcome capital 
market imperfections is consistent the results of the previous literature indicating a 
limited importance of stock market for the firms’ investments. Mayer (1988) and Röell 
(1996) established that firms in general do not use proceedings from equity issues for new 
investment. Morck et al. (1990) and Samuel (2001) find that that stock market signals are 
of very limited importance for the firms’ investment decisions compared to the 
managers’ own perception of fundamentals facing the firm.  
One should be cautious in deriving strong conclusions from our results. We 
have not explored the question of whether the ‘softer’ budget constraints in the 
countries with closer bank-firm relationships just allow an increase in investment 
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towards the optimal level, or also investment beyond the optimal level. Theoretical 
literature argues that close bank-firm relationships make it more difficult for lenders 
to precommit not to refinance long-term low-return projects at the interim date 
(Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995). In addition, the banks that are also important 
shareholders may insure that the firm chooses projects with higher needs for finance 
over those needing less finance (Baums, 1994). Thus, overinvestment may occur in 
systems with predominantly close bank-firm relationships. 
Despite this caveat, the evidence presented in this paper is highly suggestive. 
Close bank-firm relationships appear to significantly reduce capital market 
imperfections and lead to higher availability of investment financing for firms. It 
indicates that, to the extent close bank-firm relationships are more difficult to form in 
some countries than in others, this may offer firms in such countries an important 
source of comparative advantage. In particular, we may expect that these countries 
may have a comparative advantage in more capital-intensive industries. Our results 
also suggest that firms from countries where bank-firm relationships are closer may 
on average be more capital-intensive, and increase in capital intensity would for them 
represent a more important source of productivity growth than for firms in countries 
with predominantly arm’s-length bank-firm relationships. Investigation of these issues 
can be a fruitful avenue of future empirical research. An indication that these factors 
may be important is provided by the study of foreign-owned firms in the UK 
manufacturing by Wang et al. (2002). The authors find that Japanese- and European-
owned (but not US-owned) firms are significantly capital-intensive more than 
indigenous UK firms, and this is one of the factors behind the higher productivity of 
these firms compared to the indigenous firms. On the basis of our findings one can 
conjecture that higher capital intensity of Japanese- and European-owned subsidies is 
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related to lower liquidity constraints on investment for firms from Japan and some 
European countries, due to the character of their relationships with banks.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the influence of cash flow on corporate investment in 
eleven developed countries. We find that the sensitivity of investment levels to 
internally available funds differs significantly across countries. Coefficients of cash 
flow ratio in countries with predominantly close bank-firm relationships are lower and 
not significantly different from zero at conventional levels, and coefficients in 
countries with predominantly arm’s-length bank-firm relationships are higher and are 
significantly different from zero. At the same time, we find no relationship of the 
levels of financial constraints to indicators of financial development – the volume of 
credit and the relative stock market capitalization, relative to GDP. Our results are 
consistent with the view that information and incentive problems in the capital market 
have important effects on corporate investment, and that close bank-firm relationships 
can reduce these problems and thus improve the access of firms to external finance. 
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1 The countries are Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The set of countries 
for which the analysis could be undertaken was determined by the availability of data 
for the character of bank-firm relationship and by the necessity of having a sufficient 
number of firms for estimations. 
2 Love notes that she has conducted the first type of tests using manufacturing firms 
only, and that the results are similar to those for the whole sample. Love, however, 
does not conduct the second type of tests for manufacturing firms; the coefficients of 
regressions for individual countries are thus not available. 
3 This methodology is also used by Love (2001). A similar methodology is used by 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). 
4The references include: for Finland, Seppänen (2000); for Germany, Baums (1994); 
for Japan, Aoki (1994); for Australia, Kenworthy (1995); for Canada, Morck and 
Nakamura (1995); for France, Quack and Hildebrandt (1995) and Hancké and 
Soskice (1996); for Italy, Barca e.a. (1998); for the Netherlands, Bolt and Peeters 
(1997); for Spain, Garcia and Ocaña (1997); for the UK and the USA, Chew (1997). 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 
Mean values (standard deviations) 
Investment
/capital 
Cash flow 
/capital 
Sales 
/capital 
Market-to-
book 
N of
firms 
N of
observations 
Australia 0.188 0.283 3.477 2.055 36 199 
(0.093) (0.176) (1.767) (0.669)   
Canada 0.202 0.285 3.491 2.061 97 514 
 (0.154) (0.273) (2.964) (1.751)   
Finland 0.181 0.298 2.726 1.731 30 147 
 (0.146) (0.257) (1.299) (0.843)   
France 0.220 0.434 4.948 1.797 131 600 
 (0.164) (0.405) (3.449) (1.287)   
Germany 0.186 0.332 4.239 2.353 171 800 
 (0.126) (0.354) (2.833) (1.735)   
Italy 0.161 0.270 2.777 1.843 53 229 
 (0.119) (0.215) (1.386) (1.475)   
Japan 0.127 0.153 2.766 1.789 616 2298 
 (0.083) (0.136) (1.563) (1.394)   
Netherlands 0.190 0.327 3.948 2.905 44 206 
 (0.095) (0.178) (2.383) (2.343)   
Spain 0.175 0.306 3.002 1.778 30 129 
 (0.110) (0.227) (3.119) (0.919)   
UK 0.176 0.339 3.786 2.669 233 1187 
 (0.111) (0.300) (2.420) (1.771)   
US 0.227 0.458 4.660 2.651 1160 5670 
 (0.169) (0.449) (3.329) (2.152)   
Whole 
sample 
0.197 
(0.149) 
0.365 
(0.385) 
4.097 
(2.980) 
2.401 
(1.936) 
2601 11979 
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Table 2 
Country variables 
 
Private credit by 
deposit money banks 
and other financial 
institutions, 
relative to GDP, 
average 1992-1997 
Stock market 
capitalization, 
 relative to GDP, 
average 1992-1997 
Proportion of stock 
market capitalization 
held by banks 
1 2 3
Australia 0.748 0.810 0.042 
Canada 0.815 0.632 0.08 
Finland 0.731 0.334 0.15 
France 0.872 0.344 0.064 
Germany 1.020 0.245 0.136 
Italy 0.530 0.175 0.057 
Japan 2.046 0.699 0.232 
Netherlands 1.594 0.759 0.053 
Spain 0.744 0.321 0.095 
United Kingdom 1.137 1.206 0.017 
United States 1.606 0.869 0.004 
Sources: 
Columns 1-2: Calculated from data in the World Bank database ‘Financial Structure 
and Economic Development’, //www.worldbank.org 
Column 3: Carlin and Mayer (2003). The values of this variable are for most countries 
the averages for 1980-1990. For three countries the averages are for a different period: 
Canada (1981-1990), Finland (1983-1990) and Italy (1985-1988). The data for the 
UK are for 1991. 
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Table 3 
Results of investment regressions for individual countries 
 
Market-to-book 
ratio 
Sales/capital Cash flow/capital Adjusted R2
Australia 0.0333*** 
(2.67) 
0.0181*
(1.96) 
0.2050*** 
(4.06) 
.28 
Canada 0.0097 
(1.28) 
0.0271***
(3.20) 
0.1504*** 
(3.95) 
.14 
Finland 0.0381**
(1.99) 
0.1369***
(5.78) 
-0.0690 
(-1.37) 
.35 
France 0.0127**
(2.36) 
0.0314***
(4.88) 
0.0656**
(2.07) 
.23 
Germany 0.0083 
(0.17) 
0.0338*** 
(5.40) 
0.0171 
(0.89) 
.19 
Italy 0.0106*** 
(1.90) 
0.0415***
(3.35) 
0.1088*** 
(2.71) 
.20 
Japan 0.0013 
(0.66) 
0.0416*** 
(7.28) 
0.0251 
(1.18) 
.14 
Netherlands 0.0043 
(1.15) 
0.0180** 
(2.48) 
0.2209*** 
(4.97) 
.26 
Spain -0.0208*
(-1.75) 
0.0173*** 
(3.12) 
0.1216** 
(2.32) 
.17 
United Kingdom 0.0109*** 
(2.94) 
0.0252*** 
(6.26) 
0.1201*** 
(5.72) 
.24 
United States 0.0095*** 
(6.61) 
0.0320*** 
(12.54) 
0.0842*** 
(10.45) 
.20 
Note: Dependent variable is capital expenditure divided by capital. Within estimations. Year 
dummies are included in all regressions. Newey-West heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics 
are in parentheses 
* Significant at 10 percent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level. 
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Table 4 
Investment-cash flow intensities and characteristics of financial systems 
 
1 2 3 4
Dummy close bank-
firm relationships 
-0.1436*** 
(-3.91) 
 
Bank equityholdings  -0.1814** 
(-2.33) 
 
Credit/GDP   -0.0032 
(-0.05) 
 
Stock market 
capitalization/GDP 
 0.1113
(1.41) 
Intercept 0.1346*** 
(7.03) 
0.1616*** 
(4.56) 
0.0988 
(1.42) 
0.0307 
(0.59) 
Adjusted .59 .31 -0.11 .09 
Note: Dependent variable is cash flow coefficients from regressions of individual country 
samples, reported in Table 3. Number of observations is 11. OLS estimations. Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in parentheses 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level. 
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